The Free Banking Era, noted for numerous bank failures and large creditor losses, has been traditionally viewed as the experiment in laissezfaire banking that failed. Current researchers have found evidence suggesting that bank failures and creditor losses were limited to selected states and have linked the cause of bank failures to periods of falling asset prices. Free banks were required to hold long-term assets as primary reserves for short-term liabilities. Current banking theory suggests that the maturity imbalance between assets and liabilities increases the free bank's exposure to interest rate risk. Some states imposed a secondary reserve, the specie reserve requirement, that partially corrected the imbalance. This paper proposes that the link between bank failures and falling asset prices can be explained in part by one of the regulations imposed on the free banks. Six free banking states were selected to test the hypothesis that the secondary reserve requirement reduced bank failures. The evidence indicates that high-specie-reserve states experienced fewer bank failures than low-specie-reserve states.
Introduction
Throughout American history the banking industry has been closely regulated. From the beginning, restrictions have been imposed on bank entry and on bank conduct in one form or another. Generally, bank entry has been regulated by requiring the entrant to receive a special charter from a state or federal regulatory body and to meet minimum capital requirements, while bank conduct has been regulated by placing restrictions on portfolio selection, demand deposit creation, and capital adequacy. However, from 1837 to 1863 entry was not determined by the approval of a state or federal body.
This period, known as the Free Banking Era, has been viewed as an experiment in free -market banking that failed. Historians cite numerous bank failures, a plethora of bank note~and large noteholder losses to be typical of this era. Contrary to this view, recent literature has pointed out that the banks which had been considered free actually operated under several restrictions; the stories of the numerous bank failures and large noteholder losses were limited to only a few states. Economists such as Hugh Rockoff [ 3 ] , Arthur Rolnick and Warren Weber [4, 5, 6, 7] have attempted to explain the causes of the wide variety of I banking experiences during this period. Rockoff contends that certain restrictions created perverse profit opportunities in which the stockholder of a free bank could make a quick capital gain on his investment by closing the bank. In Rockoff's theory, the capital gain arose from the transfer of wealth from the creditors to the stockholder when the assets were liquidated.
Rolnick and Weber refute this claim, arguing that term-structure risk brought about many of the bank failures. According to Rolnick and Weber the stockholder closed the bank in order to minimize capital losses. Both theories focused on a reserve requirement that linked the banks' liabilities to marketable securities; they also disregarded other portfolio restrictions. This paper examines an alternate restriction, the specie reserve requirement, and presents evidence suggesting that the lenient restrictions of this provision strongly influenced bank failure, given the other portfolio restrictions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains an historical overview of the free banking system and the major asset restriction. A review of the arguments of Rockoff, Rolnick and Weber are explained in section 3. Section 4 contains a discussion of the specie reserve provision and evidence indicating a link between the leniency of this provision and banks leaving the market. Univariate statistical tests are applied to the data. In Section 5 the emp efrical results are discussed in light of the Rolnick and Weber hypothesis. Section 6 contains the concluding remarks.
Historical Overview
Prior to the Free Banking Era, state legislatures regulated entry and bank activities through the licen~ing of individually constructed charters which contained provisions regulating th' activities of bank the specified bank. One such provision, common to all the charters, allowed the v banks to issue banknotes; that is, promissory notes circulating as currency.
The banks, however, were required to redeem the banknotes for specie (gold or silver) on demand. Failure to do so would have jeopardized charter privileges.
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This system of regulating banks by legislative licencing gave way to the free banking system. Nineteen states enacted free banking laws; banks in these states were "free" to enter the banking market and were subject to uniform restrictions such as minimum capital requirements. Unlike the ...... charter banks, the free bank could not print banknotesJ but could obtain banknotes from the state banking authority by depositing marketable securities with the state authority. The state would hold the securities in reserve for the ultimate redemption of the banknotes. Like charter banks, the free banks were required to redeem the banknotes for specie on demand.
If a bank failed to honor the request of a noteholder, the bank would be required to close and the securities would be sold by the state for the redemption of the circulating notes.
The free banking states allowed two types of marketable securities as security for bank notes: state bonds and mortgages on unencumbered real estate. State bonds were allowed by eighteeen states , whereas mortgages were accepted as security in only a few states.
The amount of banknotes issued by the state banking authorities was also specified by the laws. In the early years of free banking legislation, the states required that notes issued to banks be equal to the par value of the bonds. This restriction was known as the par evaluation provision.
Later in the period the states required that the amount of notes issued to banks be equal to the market value of the bonds or the par value, whichever was less. A few states placed stronger restrictions by limiting note issue 1 to less than 100 percent of the market value of the bonds.
Mortgages were treated differently than state bonds. In general, a mortgage was eligible as collateral if the mortgage value was no more than half the market value of the mortgaged land. The amount of notes issued by the authorities could not exceed the mortgage value.
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In addition to the market security requirement, some states enacted a specie reserve requirement. The restriction required banks to hold specie equal to a specified percentage of the amount of notes in circulation.
2 In general, the restrictions specified that the required amount of specie was to be on hand at all times, but some of the states allowed the required amount of specie to be the average specie holdings for a specified period.
Although the market security and specie reserve provisions were enacted with the intent of protecting the noteholders of the free bank from losses, the evidence seems to indicate that large losses were experienced in several perfectly riskless assets such as specie, thereby reducing the probability of default on note redemption to zero. As the banker reduced the percentage of notes backed by specie the probability of default increased. In other words, the specie reserve provided security against interest rate risk of the market securities backing the notes and reduced the probability of banks leaving the market.
The Specie Reserve Provision
The specie reserve requirements of six free banking states are examined in this section: New York, Indiana, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Virginia, and Louisiana. 4 These states represent a cross-section of specie reserve requirements and experiences.
The specie reserve requirements enacted by these states varied from a zero to a thirty-three percent specie reserve requirement. Virginia and Louisiana represent states that enacted high specie reserve requirements - The number of banks that entered and exited was collected from these reports. Banks that exited were divided into two classes: banks that closed and banks that failed. A closed bank was defined as a bank that was able to redeem its banknotes at par (i.e., no noteholder losses) whereas a failed bank was defined as a bank that was unable to redeem its notes at par (i.e., noteholders suffered losses). A detailed listing of each bank that operated in a given state was I 10 made and the tabulation of all closing and failing banks was compiled from this list. The following discussion presents the final compilation for each state.
The Experiences of the States
Initial support for the hypothesis that a lenient specie reserve requirement increased the incidence of bank exits is revealed by the data presented in Table 1 . (Since the the size of the banking markets varied from state to state, the number of banks that operated under each law in each state and the percentage of operating banks that left the market for each state are also included in Table 1 .)
The aggregate experience for each state indicates that exits were generally higher in zero percent specie reserve states than in high specie reserve states. The high specie reserve states, Virginia and Louisiana, record the fewest number of banks leaving the market. In the 12 1/2 percents specie reserve states, the evidence shows conflicting experiences. Indiana experienced a large number of bank exits, while New York experienced few bank exits. This result also holds after adjusting for market size. In the states that did not enact a specie reserve requirement, the number of banks leaving the market were the highest among the states examined. Even after adjusting for market size, these states had the highest percentages of bank exits, recording at least 30 percent of the operating banks leaving the market.
The states are also grouped according to the laws under which they operated and are presented in Table 2 . In this table the number of free banks that operated in the market under each provision is indicated along
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., Table 1 appear to indicate that differing specie reserve requirements among the states could explain the number of banks leaving the market.
Univariate Test
The notion that differing specie reserve requirements explains exits is (Let zero, twelve, and twenty and above be assigned group numbers 1, 2, 3, respectively, and let the sample proportion of group i be denoted as X .• ) l. ·Since it is expected that a lenient specie reserve would result in a larger number of failures, the hypothesis tested is that the mean of the failure rate, closure rate, and below-par rate under a zero specie reserve is significantly larger than the means of the twelve percent or the twenty percent and above specie requirements: The results of the tests, given in Table 3 , indicate that there is a significant difference in the failure rates between states that enacted "'t.
specie reserve requirements less than and equal to twelve percent, and states ' that enacted specie reserve requirements of twenty percent and above. Both the sample proportions of zero percent and twelve percent are significantly larger than the sample proportions of twenty percent and above at the 99 percent and 95 percent significance level, respectively. However, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the difference in proportions of zero and twelve percent specie reserve.
The evidence on the closure rate in Table 3 also indicates a significant difference between the zero percent, and the twelve and twenty and above reserve requirement at the 95 percent significance level and at the 99 percent significance level, respectively. The null hypotheses cannot be rejected for the difference in proportions of twelve percent and twenty percent and above.
Finally, the test on the below-par rate indicates that the specie reserve does not show a significant difference in the likelihood that an exiting bank will fail; that is the null hypotheses cannot be rejected.
In summary, the evidence supports the previous conclusion that the enactment of a high specie reserve requirement reduced bank failures and closures. A bank that existed under a strong specie reserve restriction was less likely to fail or close than a bank that existed under a lenient specie I reserve requirement. In both tests the twelve percent specie reserve proved to be a critical point in specie holdings. A specie reserve greater than twelve percent appeared to reduce the number of failures while a specie reserve of twelve percent and lower significantly increased the number of * -significant at the 1% level.
**-significant at the 5% level.
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closures. However, there was no significant difference in the likelihood that an exiting bank failed. This result is not surprising since the likelihood of a bank failing or closing also depends on the current market conditions. The effects of market conditions on banks exiting under different specie reserve requirements are analyzed in the next section.
Comparison with the Rolnick and Weber Hypothesis
The analysis in the preceding section indicated that there may have been some link between the number of banks leaving the market in a particular state and the type of specie reserve requirement that the state required.
One explanation of this link is that the specie reserves helped reduce the risk of default associated with an economic downturn. The specie reserve could have helped free bankers meet unanticipated demands for specie that may have been initiated by the fall in bond prices. The reserves could have also offset noteholder losses from the bonds, devaluation.
The reason for the specie reserve's influence is clear. Since the price elasticity with respect to the change in interest rates is larger for a long term asset than a short term liability, a decrease in the interest rate would result in a larger depreciation of the assets than the liabilities. The raw data is presented in Table 4 . 10 There were 135 banks identified as exiting during a falling bond price period. The break'ti own of banks that exited indicates that there were sixty-two bank failures under the zero specie reserve, twelve under the twelve percent specie reserve during the falling bond price period.
The number of failures and closures as a percentage of the total number of banks that exited is shown in Table 4 . It indicates that a larger percentage of exiting banks failed under the lenient specie reserve requirements than under the strict specie reserve requirements. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that a lenient specie 19 2 Louisiana enacted a reserve requirement that required banks to hold specie or ninety day commercial paper equal to 100% of the notes in circulation. and p is the expected proportion of the combined sample and q is the complement of p.
8 The free banking laws also contained a provision that allowed the state banking authority to call in banknotes when the market value of the securities was less than the amount of notes issued. The noteholder would also have the assurance that corrective measures would be taken.
9 This study includes the first part of the N.Y. experience; the Rolnick and Weber study did not.
1~ test on proportions cannot be used in this analysis. Since the data is divided into time segments, the base number of banks operating /8ries in each time segment.
